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WHAT Do I DO FOR THE
ECONOMISTS?
Warren F. Schwartzt
I was in Henry Manne's very first "Pareto in the Pines" summer
camp for law professors. The effect of the experience, and my effort
to gain a command of the economic theory that it inspired, was profound. It is not an exaggeration to say that all of my teaching and
research was revised to accommodate the centrality of the economic
paradigm in my approach to legal problems. As this process unfolded, I had the extremely good fortune of working with, and being
instructed by, outstanding economists. So, I cheerfully acknowledge
that economics and economists have done a great deal for me. In this
paper, however, I address a different question that I have been pondering for a long time. What have I done for economists and economic theory?
When I say "I," I don't mean to limit the discussion to my personal contribution. Rather I am interested in the contribution of people like me. What I mean by "people like me" are those scholars who
have no formal training in economics but do have a sophisticated understanding of the process through which legal rules are formulated
and implemented.
With increasing generality, and decreasing egocentricity, I pose
three questions and search for what I believe to be a common answer
to all of them: (1)(a) Why have extremely able economists been willing to collaborate with people like me? (b) What benefits have they
realized from the experience? (2) What is the essential contribution
to "law and economics" of people like me? (3) To what extent has
economic theory been enriched by economists addressing legal questions and collaborating with people like me?
I do not have definitive answers to any of these questions. What
I can offer, however, is three respects in which people like me may
have insights which even talented economists working alone may be
unable to duplicate.

t Professor of Law and Director of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
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I put aside the obvious contribution of establishing what the law
is. The relevant portion of the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, could easily be found by a legal assistant with only a superficial
understanding of the problem being addressed. In simple terms, people like me are more than "gofers."
The first contribution that I am able to identify is what I characterize as diagnosing the legal problem. Every legal problem implicates a central tension between competing ends, or equivalently, an
essential set of tradeoffs. The first step in doing good legal scholarship is to identify this core set of issues. There is a substantial danger
that economists will do this poorly. Indeed, I believe that economists
often do this poorly and produce an elegant analysis of a trivial aspect
of the question under consideration.
A much harder question is what do people like me know that
makes us better able to diagnosis the legal problem. My speculation
is that we have a better understanding of the complexities of the legal
process. The formulation and implementation of legal rules implicates a recurring set of issues concerning the use of language to
communicate; the ability to anticipate future events; the information
available to and incentives of decision-makers; and the many margins
on which the people formulating and implementing legal rules, as
well as those whose behavior is affected by the possibility that the
legal system will impose a cost on them if they do certain things. Issues like these can, of course, all be translated into formal economic
terms. But they interrelate in a complicated way in the process of
formulating and implementing legal rules. People like me often understand this complicated process better than economists whose inclination is to abstract from complexity in order to gain a more precise
understanding of one aspect of a complicated reality.
The second contribution that people like me can make is to constantly remind the economists that the "law" in law and economics
comes before, not after, the "economics." A large body of work by
economists about law concerns itself with demonstrating the inefficiencies produced by government intervention. This work has made
an important contribution in limiting, and sometimes eliminating,
foolish regulation like the former antitrust policy with respect to
mergers, government price fixing in transportation, and restrictions on
competition among law firms. But inefficient intervention of this
kind represents a very small, and relatively unimportant, part of the
legal system.
What people like me understand is that investment in human and
physical capital and the mutually advantageous exchange of goods
and services can only occur because of the existence of a legal foun-
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dation. Such foundations permit people to capture a sufficient share
of the benefits they create so that they are willing to commit the resources and take the risks required to produce those benefits.
From this perspective, the interesting question is not why there is
so much rent seeking and inefficient regulation but rather, how have
we managed to provide such a good foundation for socially useful
economic activity; especially when some people seek to manipulate
government to serve their narrow interests and government officials
have such bad incentives to produce socially beneficial law.
This question, of course, has taken on great urgency in the countries that have recently turned to capitalism but do not have the legal
structure enabling investment and exchange to occur that has evolved
over a very long period in countries like the United States. In these
countries, it is necessary to decide both what legal provisions should
be employed and how the political system should be designed so that
the miracle of a self-interested population and body of government
officials with bad incentives producing a good set of laws can be duplicated.
The third contribution that people like me can make is with respect to what I think of as the reentry problem. After a legal problem
is diagnosed, an economist may construct a formal model designed to
capture the essential interactions that will determine the behavioral
consequences produced by the legal provision being studied. The
model will, of necessity, abstract from the complex reality in which
these interactions occur. It is, of course, only through abstraction of
this kind that better understanding can be gained.
When, however, the attempt is made to use the results reached
by the formal analysis to provide a basis for a policy recommendation, the complications that have been put aside are once more encountered. It is often difficult to know how strong or general are the
policy implications that can be derived from the formal analysis.
People like me may have something to contribute in determining this. Once again it is our grasp of the complexity of a legal
system which may permit us to determine better than the economist who has done the formal analysis, exactly how the insights
gained through the formal analysis may best be put to practical use
in the legal regime being studied.
CONCLUSION

I have long wondered where I fit in the world of law and economics and, even more grandly, the world of economic theory. This
question has considerable importance for this Symposium.
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Henry Manne's programs have played a large role in inducing
many legal academics to adopt the economic paradigm as the essential organizing principle for their teaching and scholarship. He is
surely entitled to much gratitude for what he has done for us. Maybe,
however, the economists also owe him a debt of gratitude for getting
them involved with people like me.

